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Abstract
Several countries extend collective bargaining agreements to entire sectors, therefore
binding non-subscriber workers and employers. These extensions may address coordina-
tion issues but may also distort competition by imposing sector-specific minimum wages
and other work conditions that are not appropriate for many firms. In this paper, we anal-
yse the impact of such extensions along several margins drawing on firm-level monthly data
for Portugal, a country where extensions have been widespread until recently. Drawing
on the scattered timing of the extensions, we find that both formal employment and wage
bills in the relevant sector fall, on average, by 2% - and by 25% more across small firms
- over the four months after an extension is issued. These results are driven by both
reduced hirings and increased firm closures. On the other hand, informal work, not sub-
ject to labour law or extensions, tends to increase. Our findings are robust to several
checks, including a falsification exercise based on extensions that were announced but not
implemented.
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1 Introduction
The minimum wage is typically regarded as a policy variable that exhibits little variability.
Indeed, a national minimum wage, if applicable, tends to be revised at a relatively low time
frequency, possibly with further (upward) adjustments at a sub-national level. However, in
many countries, the number of minimum wages is actually very large and their values vary
frequently not only over time and space but also along other dimensions. This situation arises
from minimum wages set by collective bargaining agreements, in particular when such agree-
ments are extended by a country’s authorities beyond their subscribing employer associations
and unions - and their affiliated workers (Traxler & Behrens 2002). Since collective agree-
ments typically establish minimum wages for the most used job types and job levels in those
firms, their extensions are equivalent to the setting of fully-binding minimum wages, even if
only for specific economic sectors or sector-region pairs.
This paper examines empirically some of the main economic effects of such extensions of
collective bargaining agreements and the resulting likely large number of binding minimum
wages. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to address this important question,
in particular from a causal perspective.1 Specifically, we evaluate the impact of extensions in
terms of the employment and wage bills of the affected sectors.
Such extensions - which also explain the large wedges between union density and union
coverage in many countries - may promote the leveling of the playing field in terms of working
conditions (including minimum wages), as they require all firms in a sector to comply with
the same set of minimum standards determined jointly by a subset of firms and workers
in that sector. Indeed, any ‘unfair’ competition that may follow from firms undercutting a
collective agreements’ wage levels is automatically ruled out from a legal perspective once
that agreement’s extension comes into force.
On the other hand, the combination of minimum pay levels and other working conditions
that follows from a collective agreement, namely in terms of rent sharing (Abowd & Lemieux
1993, Martins 2009b, Card et al. 2014) may not be appropriate for all firms and workers in
a sector. In particular, smaller or new firms may target different segments of the product
1See Margolis (1994) for an earlier, related paper - but focusing on theoretical aspects of collective agreement
extensions -, Magruder (2012) an analysis of a developing country, and Murtin et al. (2014) for a cross-country,
time series analysis. On the other hand, the minimum wage literature is very large. Recent contributions
include Neumark & Wascher (2006), Portugal & Cardoso (2006), and Neumark et al. (2013). See also Avouyi-
Dovi et al. (2013) for a related study of collective bargaining.
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market, which imply different optimal settings in terms of working conditions, especially in a
context of globalisation and technological change. Indeed, extensions may be seen as a tool
to raise rivals’ costs, therefore distorting competition in a given sector (Haucap et al. 2001).
Moreover, the clearing of the labour market during downturns may require greater flexibility
in working conditions than the one established in collective agreements, in particular in low
inflation environments (European Commission 2011).
Our examination therefore also contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of
minimum wages, whose potential role is much wider than that stemming from a single value
over a period of time, typically affecting only a relatively small subset of low-skilled workers.
In fact, as indicated above, the many countries that extend collective agreements, including
France, Germany, Italy and Spain (du Caju et al. 2008, Visser 2013), are in fact subject
to many thousands of minimum wages, potentially binding most workers, and evolving in
a partly decentralised way, with yerly adjustments in many instances. These circumstances
also magnify the scope for downward nominal wage rigidity effects (Steinar & Fredrik 2008,
Martins et al. 2010, Dias et al. 2013).
Our empirical analysis is based on particularly rich data from Portugal, a country where
extension mechanisms have been used widely until recently (Cardoso & Portugal 2005, IMF
2011, Martins 2014), leading to nearly 30,000 de facto minimum wages, as indicated in the title
of the paper. In fact, and as will be shown later, approximately 90% of the sectoral collective
agreements issued in the period under analysis (2007-2011) were subject to extensions, even if
in most cases the representativeness of the bargaining partners was poor. This period is also
characterised by increasing unemployment in the country, as it includes the great recession of
2008-09 and the beginnings of the eurozone debt crisis in 2010-11.
Our data is based on a list of all extensions implemented over the period under analysis,
including information on their timings and relevant applicable industries. Furthermore, we
also draw on monthly records of formal employment, hirings, separations, salaries, and other
variables of each firm in the country over the same period. Interestingly, we also examine
data on informal service providers - self-employed workers, in many cases in disguised labour
relationships -, an important margin of adjustment in segmented labour markets, despite the
greater focus of the literature on fixed-term contracts (Blanchard & Landier 2002). We then
employ a standard difference-in-differences approach, where we track industry-specific time
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series of employment or other variables, and examine their changes following the issuing of
the extensions.
Our results, robust to several checks, including a falsification exercise, indicate a strong
negative causal effect of extensions upon both employment and wage bills. Over the four
months after an extension comes into force, the average employment levels in the sectors
affected drop by 2%. Wage bills also drop by a similar magnitude. These changes are driven
by a strong negative effect of extensions upon hirings and firm closures, but not in terms of
separations or firm openings. On the other hand, informal employment increases, leading to
further segmentation between protected jobs and non-standard work forms.
The next section discusses in greater detail some economics of the extensions of collective
agreements and also presents the specific case of Portugal, including its labour market and
industrial relations. Section 3 describes the data sets used in this paper and some descriptive
statistics. Section 4 presents the main results, Section 5 several robustness checks and Section
6 an analysis of firm entry and exit effects. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Collective agreements extensions
Collective agreements are an important building block of employment relations across many
countries, in particular in continental Europe. These agreements establish a large number of
working conditions that apply to the signatory parties, including minimum wages by job type
and job tenure but also many other issues such as working time, fringe benefits, training, health
and safety, promotions, contract types, severance pay, bonuses, grievances, etc. Some of these
work conditions may be established at a more or less generous level than the conditions that
the country’s employment legislation determines as applicable, in the absence of a collective
agreement.
Depending on the level of centralisation of the collective agreements (Calmfors & Driffill
1988), the signatory parties will typically be an employer association - representing a number
of firms, typically in the same sector, sometimes also from a specific region - and one or
more unions - representing a number of affiliated workers, most of whom are employed in the
firms represented by the equivalent employer association. Moreover, the scope of collective
agreements will initially correspond to the workers subject to the double affiliation principle:
workers that are simultaneously members of the subscribing union(s) and that are employed
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by firms that are member of the subscribing employer associations. The combination of these
two dimensions implies that, across several European countries, with the notable exception
of the Nordic region, the direct coverage of collective agreements is relatively small, given the
typically low union and employer association density rates, especially in Southern Europe.
Non-covered workers have their employment relationships determined instead by individual
contracts bargained directly with their employers.
However, collective agreements may also be extended by a country’s authorities, typically
the labour ministry in an automatic or discretionary process. In any case, once an extension
is in force, the terms of the original collective agreements apply not only to workers subject
to the double affiliation principle but also to all workers that work in the industry in which
the extension is applicable.2 Collective agreement extensions explain the large gap between
union density and union coverage that can be observed in many countries. Once an extension
is in force, the affected workers and employers have to follow the terms and conditions of
the underpinning collective agreement, including the payment of possibly higher salaries, in
comparison to those previously agreed under individual contracts.
The arguments that have been presented for such public intervention in the private bilat-
eral bargaining between employers and workers have been manifold, including views similar to
those used in support of minimum wages. For instance, extensions lead to the establishment
of minimum wages for more qualified workers that do not meet the double affiliation crite-
rion and which otherwise would only be subject to a likely non-binding national minimum
wage. In this case, such additional minimum wages can increase living standards, promote
a more balanced income distribution and foster incentives for firm-specific training. Further-
more, monopsony arguments in support of minimum wages may be even more applicable to
workers that have moved upwards in a firm’s hierarchy, given the role of firm-specific skills
and information asymmetries. More generally, the social dialogue that follows from successful
collective bargaining (boosted by the perspective of extensions) can foster the development of
a good working environment in the firms involved, with benefits to both sides of the labour
relationship.3
However, such higher minimum wage levels may hurt employment levels, in particular of
2Collective agreements can originally be restricted to a given region, in which case the extension is likely to
be restricted to that same region. In any case, for simplicity, we will henceforth only refer to extensions within
industries.
3The author was involved in several discussions with representatives from employer and union confederations
in Portugal in which these views were expressed.
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the less skilled within job types, while promoting segmentation and youth unemployment.
High minimum wages may also lead to higher prices, with negative effects in terms of the
purchasing power of the poor. On the other hand, the width of minimum wages and the
resulting downward nominal wage rigidity could diminish significantly the ability of the labour
market to accommodate negative shocks.4 Indeed, extensions magnify the scope for downward
nominal wage rigidity effects in times of low inflation and or economic downturns (Steinar &
Fredrik 2008, Martins et al. 2010, Dias et al. 2013) even in countries where real wage rigidity
is not present when inflation is higher (Martins et al. 2012).
Moreover, the absence of extensions could promote ‘unfair competition’ from firms outside
employer associations that pay lower wages than those set in collective agreements. These
firms can therefore charge lower prices in the relevant product market, undercutting their com-
petitors that are subject to the more generous working conditions that follow from collective
bargaining. In the absence of extensions, such competition will exert a downward pressure on
wages. On the other hand, as OECD (2012) put it, when recommending that extensions are
abolished altogether in Portugal, ’[...] dominant firms impose wage and working conditions
on others via the administrative extension of collective agreements, reducing competition and
entry, thereby hurting competitiveness’, echoing the views in Haucap et al. (2001). Another
related aspect is that minimum wages established or influenced greatly by social partners (the
national-level representatives of employer associations and unions) tend to be higher than
those without social partner intervention (Boeri 2012).
It is also important to note that the incentives for membership of employer associations are
positively affected by extensions. If these are likely to be issued, membership would be more
advantageous as it would allow one to influence the outcome of a collective agreement. If not,
then members would have to follow a collective agreement while non-members would benefit
from the greater flexibility of individual bargaining or firm-specific collective agreements. On
the other hand, the incentives for workers to become union members are diminished by the
prospective of an extension given the resulting scope for free-riding.
4Jimeno & Thomas (2013) compare labor market outcomes under firm-level and sector-level bargaining in
a Mortensen-Pissarides economy with firm-specific productivity shocks and find that unemployment is lower
under firm-level bargaining.
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2.1 The case of Portugal
In Portugal, the country studied in our empirical analysis, employment law establishes that
’[a] collective agreement [...] in force can be applied, entirely or partly, by an extension
ordnance to employers and employees in the economic activity and profession considered in
the collective agreement’ (article 514 of the Labour Code). Furthermore, ’[t]he extension is
possible after weighing the social and economic circumstances that may justify it, in particular
the identity or economic or social similarity of the cases in the extension and the underlying
collective agreement.’.
Until early 2011, collective agreements were typically always extended by the Govern-
ment following a request from one (or both) of its subscribers (the union or the employers’
association). This extension would widen the domain of the collective agreement, originally
limited to those workers affiliated with the union and employed by a firm affiliated with the
employers’ association, to all workers employed in the relevant industry. This original do-
main, before extension, was usually particularly small, as in many other (Southern) European
countries: for instance, Portugal & Vilares (2013) reports that only 11% of the private sector
workforce in Portugal is unionised. Moreover, union rates are higher in more concentrated
sectors, where the scope for rent sharing is stronger (Abowd & Lemieux 1993, Martins 2009b)
while the heterogeneity of firm types is likely to be less pronounced.
Another important aspect in the case of Portugal is that general employment law, which is
applicable to all workers, is already considerably detailed, covering most aspects also regulated
in collective agreements. In fact, the OECD Employment Protection Legislation international
rankings typically placed Portugal in the top positions across its different dimensions during
the period covered in our empirical analysis (OECD 2012). This implies that the most im-
portant provisions that are actually introduced by collective agreements (and extensions, in
a second stage) concern the minimum wages per job type and not other aspects of the labour
relationship.
Table 1 presents statistics about new and revised collective agreements and their extensions
in Portugal in each year over the period 2005-2012. Collective agreements are split into
their three main categories, depending on the employer side of the bargaining: an employers’
association, a group of firms, or a single firm. Extensions are almost always only applied for
and issued in the first case as the latter two concern only on one firm or a small set of firms
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(typically belonging to the same holding or economic group).5
The figures suggest a very high level of sectoral centralisation of bargaining in Portugal.
Indeed, sectoral agreements are clearly the most predominant form of collective agreements, at
about 150 per year up to 2010. This figure compares to about only 25 multi-firm agreements
and 70 firm-specific agreements, in a context of a total of more than 300,000 firms in the
country. More importantly, a large percentage (about 90%) of sectoral agreements are subject
to extensions over the period.6 The figures also indicate that, in 2011 and, in particular, in
2012 there is a steep decline in collective agreements (except in the case of firm-specific
ones) and extensions. This development follows from the adjustment programme adopted
in Portugal - discussed in more detail below - and used in one of our robustness checks
(Subsection 5.5).
Another important component of Table 1 concerns the number of workers affected by
the new and revised collective agreements of each type and in each year, including also the
effect of the extension.7 Between 2005 and 2010, in the case of sectoral agreements, these
numbers average 1.4 million workers per year - or approximately half the size of the private
sector employment level in Portugal. Multi-firm and firm-specific agreements have a much
smaller scope, of about 50,000 workers each per year. Also noteworthy is the large decline in
sectoral agreement coverage in 2012, when both the number of agreements and extensions is
substantially smaller.
It is also important to note the timing of the production of effects of the extension, which
typically coincided with the production of effects of its underpinning collective agreement.
This ensures that the collective agreement can be applied to all workers from the same time,
regardless of their union affiliation or the employer association affiliation of their firms, typ-
ically January. However, this practice also forced employers bound by the extension to pay
immediately or over a short period any resulting wage arrears - from the differences since the
production of effects until the publication of the extension in terms of the actual wages and
the new floors set by the collective agreement. This may exacerbate any negative effects of
extensions on employment, particularly for liquidity constrained firms.
Finally, we mention that a new extension framework was established in 2012, requiring
5See Hartog et al. (2002) for a comparison of wages under different collective agreement types.
6The number of extensions exceeds that of agreements in some years because some extensions concern
agreements signed in the previous year.
7Given that there is no information about workers subject to the double affiliation at least until 2010, it is
not possible to obtain statistics about the number of workers affected before the extension.
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that the employers that subscribe to the collective agreements should employ at least 50%
of the workers in the sector in which the extension is to be issued. This followed from a
commitment by the Portuguese Government, in the context of its 2011-2014 economic and
financial adjustment programme, to ‘define clear criteria to be followed for the extension
of collective agreements and commit to them. The representativeness of the negotiating
organisations and the implications of the extension for the competitive position of nonaffiliated
firms will have to be among these criteria’. Simultaneously, the Government also agreed with
the troika ‘that, over the programme period, any increase in the minimum wage will take place
only if justified by economic and labour market developments and agreed in the framework of
the programme review’, which resulted in a minimum wage freeze over the period 2012-2014.8
3 Data
This empirical paper draws on two novel data sets. The first one is obtained from monthly
social security records covering the entire population of firms in Portugal between January
2007 and June 2012. These data are of high quality as they are used for the processing of
social security contributions (typically 34.75% of the salary of each employee).
The records available indicate the number of formal employees as well as the number of
service providers contracted by each firm in each month.9 The records also indicate additional
variables such as the number of new hires and leavers (only in the case of workers, not service
providers) and the wage bills (both of workers and service providers) of each firm in each
month. An additional variable is the industry affiliation of the firm, according to an ISIC
rev. 4 five-digit code.
The data set originally comprises over 26.1 million firm-month observations, which refer
to 646,788 different firm identifiers. Each firm appears in the data set a mean of 40.4 times
over the 66 months covered. The average firm size, in terms of the number of employees, is
7.5. Moreover, the total number of workers per month varies from a peak of 3.09 million (in
July 2008) to a trough of 2.82 million (in April 2012), consistent with the business cycle over
8Since mid-2011 a number of reforms has been implemented towards making the labour market more flexible
and competitive while eroding the segmentation between insiders and outsiders. These reforms included cuts in
severance, wider economic dismissals procedures, greater flexibility in working time arrangements, a reduction
in the number of holidays and bank holidays and greater scope for the involvement of workers’ councils.
Additional reforms were also introduced over the period in terms of unemployment benefits, access to regulated
professions, training and active labour market policies (IMF 2011, Martins 2014).
9These service providers are typically know as ’recibos verdes’. Several other countries have similar work
types, such as ’Scheinselbstaendigkeit’ in Germany.
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the months covered.
The second key data set used lists all extensions of collective agreements issued between
January 2008 until December 2011. The data set also includes information about the relevant
industry affected by the extension, in terms of a two- to five-digit ISIC rev. 4 code, depending
on the width of the collective agreement. This information is obtained by the Ministry of
the Economy and Employment of Portugal from the texts of both the individual collective
agreements and extension orders.
According to this second data set, a total of 375 extensions were issued between 2008 and
2011: 136 in 2008, 106 in 2009, 116 in 2010 and 17 in 2011.10 The extensions have been
published relatively uniformly across all months over the four years analysed, with a peak of
69 in February and a trough of 17 in June. 2011 is an exception, as all 17 extensions were
published until May, given the political context described above.
As to the timing of when extensions enter into force (in many cases before they are issued,
as discussed above), this is heavily concentrated in January (276 extensions across the different
years, out of the total of 375), in order to coincide with the typical time of production of effects
of the collective agreement underpinning the extension. The average difference between the
two dates (publication and production of effects) over the 372 extensions for which both dates
are available is 10.4 months. This implies that firms directly affected by the extension (i.e. that
paid salaries in between the minimum levels determined by the previous and the new versions
of the relevant collective agreement) will be forced to back-date possibly substantial wage
increments.
Given that each extension may cover more than one industry, and each industry may
be indicated at a different level of aggregation, we reshape the list of extensions in terms
of specific industry/extension combinations. Furthermore, each extension industry code was
also matched to all corresponding relevant five-digit industry codes.11 This resulted in a set of
963 five-digit-industry/extension pairs, scattered across 51 two-digit industries. The largest
10These figures do not correspond exactly to those of Table 1 since they refer to extension orders while those
in the table refer to the number of collective agreements that were subject to extensions. Occasionally one
extension covers more than one agreement, particularly when an employer’s association celebrates the same
agreement with two different unions.
11This relevance criterion is met when there is at least one firm under such industry code in the social security
data set. As an example, consider the extension of a collective agreement in the metal manufacturing sector
involved both ISIC codes 25 (‘Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment’) and
265 (‘Manufacture of measuring, testing, navigating and control equipment’). These two codes corresponded
to 29 five-digit industries under sector 25, from 25110 to 25992, and six five-digit industries under sector 265,
from 26510 to 26530.
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number of extensions are found in manufacture of food products (ISIC 10, 100 extensions),
crop and animal production (01, 72), retail trade (47, 78), wholesale trade (46, 67), and
manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (26, 56).
It should be mentioned that, in the same way that extensions apply only to specific indus-
tries, they may also apply only to specific occupations or to specific regions. However, given
that we do not have information about the breakdown by occupation of the employment of
each firm in our data set, we assume that all extensions cover all workers in the relevant in-
dustry. This is likely to be the case in the majority of extensions. In any case, this assumption
will introduce some degree of measurement error in our analysis that will bias downward our
estimates presented in the next two sections. As to the regional dimension, we disregarded in
our main results the 71 extensions of collective agreements that we considered of a subnational
scope, given that we do not have information on the regional location of the establishment in
our data set.
Finally, the two main data sets are merged in order to obtain combined information about
employment levels across industries and the timing of the publication of the collective bargain-
ing extensions. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the resulting data set, covering nearly
84,000 observations. The mean employment level across those industry-month observations is
2,095 (with a standard deviation of 6,903), while the mean wage bill is 2.07 million euros (with
a standard deviation of 6.3). Mean monthly hires are 60.1 individual while the corresponding
figure for separations is 62.2. The table also describes a key dummy variable that flags the
industry-month observations in the four months after the publication of a relevant extension,
which correspond to 0.3% of all observations.
3.1 Case study: the 2010 construction sector agreement
In order to facilitate a better understanding of the process surrounding the extension of col-
lective agreements, we provide an illustration based on a specific case study: the construction
sector collective agreement signed between the AECOPS employer association (and other em-
ployer associations) and the SETACCOP union. This agreement involved a total of 20,000
employers and 300,000 workers, according to its text and based on the total size of the sector
(i.e. after the extension was issued, as was typically the case at that time).
The agreement included over 180 clauses, including provisions on minimum wages by
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worker category, description of main job titles, health and safety, fixed term contracts, trial
periods, holidays, overtime, and replacement of workers. Many of these clauses replicated the
provisions already in place in the general labour law and in the 2005 version of the collective
agreement. The agreement was published in late March 2010, establishing wage floors that
came into effect from January 1st. The wage floors ranged from 380 euros (apprentices) to
841 euros (directors and managers), which compare to a minimum wage of 475 euros (380 for
apprentices) in that same year.
The agreement was subject to an extension issued in July 2010 towards all workers not
directly covered, except those affiliated with another union, given the opposition expressed
by that union following the preliminary publication of the extension. The extension also
determined that the new wage floors had retroactive effect, from January 1st, 2010, but the
overdue wage increments could be paid monthly in up to four installments from September.
The extension legal document provided some additional information about its predicted
impact obtained from a background study conducted by the Ministry of Employment. In
particular, the study estimated that 60,000 workers would be affected by the new wage floor
tables set by the collective agreement for 2010. Of those 60,000 workers, 25,000 were earning
6% or more below the new minimum levels. These figures were based on the latest data avail-
able at the time, 2008, which were extrapolated to 2010 using an estimate of the inflation level
over the period. Moreover, the extension text also indicated that most firms that employed
workers that were paid below the new wage floors had nine or fewer employees.
4 Results
Following from our theoretical discussion, there are a number of economic variables that may
be affected by the extension of collective agreements. Given the data available, we focus on
employment and wage related variables, along both standard, labour-law-regulated dimensions
and more flexible, service provision aspects. In the case of the former, we also investigate the
impact of extensions upon worker flows, namely hirings and separations.
Our identification approach is based on the scattered timing of extensions: as indicated
in Section 3, extensions are issued virtually uniformly along the twelve months of the year
over the four year period under study. In this context, we employ a standard difference-
in-differences estimator, in which we contrast the development over time of each variable of
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interest in industries subject to extensions in terms of other industries namely those where
extensions are not issued or not issued at the same time.
The relatively high-frequency nature of the data, at least from the perspective of microe-
conometric studies, with up to 60 observations per each one of the 1,500 five-digit industries
under study, allows us to control for time-invariant heterogeneity in a detailed way. Overall,
our rich data structure also allows us to construct credible counterfactuals of the variables of
interest at the time when extensions are more likely to bite.
As to the definition of the relevant time range from the perspective of the impact of the
extension, we focus on a dummy variable capturing the four months immediately subsequent to
an extension in the relevant sector. This time window strikes us as an appropriate compromise
between a period long enough to capture any possible immediate effects while at the same
time not too long given the yearly or nearly yearly frequency of the revision and subsequent
extension of several collective agreements and their wage floor tables. There is also an inflation
effect to take into account, which will prompt the wage increase to be partly cancelled out
over time in real terms.12
In this context, we estimate equations of the following format:
Employmentit = βExtensionit + αi + γjt + eit, (1)
The dependent variable in this case, Employmentit, corresponds to the logarithm of the
employment level of industry i in month t. Extensionit is the key regressor of interest, a
dummy variable equal to one in the first four months after the extension of the collective
agreement in industry i comes into force (and zero otherwise), i.e. over periods t+ 1 to t+ 4.
Furthermore, αi refers to the (over 1,400) five-digit-industry fixed effects, one for each industry
i, and γjt refers to the (540) time fixed effects, one for each pair of a specific month and a
specific one-digit industry (denoted by subscript j). These time-industry fixed effects allow for
an extremely flexible estimation of time patterns, specific to different industries, from which
any significant systematic differences in the dependent variable of the relevant industries over
the periods immediately subsequent to extensions can be documented, allowing for possible
correlations between the timing of extensions and particular trends in the business cycle of
the sector at stake.
12In any case, later we also consider more flexible specifications, namely by allowing for possible anticipation
effects or effects stemming from the collective agreements before extensions are issued.
13
Table 3 presents our main results, following the specification above. Besides Employment,
we also consider complementary dependent variables such as Hirings, Separations, and Wage
bills (of workers and service providers).13 Moreover, given the logarithmic transformation
of the dependent variable, the coefficients on the Extensionit dummy variable reported can
be interpreted as a percentage effect. The result presented in column 1, top row, indicates
that the average number of total workers in an industry falls by 2% over the four months
subsequent to an extension. To the extent that real wages increase by 2% to 4% over the
period, the implicit elasticities of labour demand can be estimated to range between .5 and
1, the latter value at the top of the typical range of estimates in the literature.
Additionally, when considering separately hirings and separations, the results in columns 2
and 3, top row, indicate that the industry size effect is driven essentially by the former, which
fall by over 4%, while separations are not affected. On the other hand, service providers, not
subject to the extensions’ wage floors (nor to any aspect of labour law), see their number
increase by 1.4%. However, since, as indicated in Table 2, the number of service providers by
industry is typically far smaller than that of formal employees (214 vs 2,096, on average), the
increase in the former does not compensate for the decrease in the latter in aggregate terms.
We now turn to the second main row of Table 3, which focuses on different measures of
wages. The results indicate that the wage bill of workers, i.e. the sum of all salaries paid to
formal workers, falls by 2.2% on average over the four months following an extension. This
coefficient is of the same sign and virtually the same as the one obtained for the number of
underlying workers (-2%). This result indicates that the net effect on the wage bill is driven
by (lower) quantities and not (higher) prices, a point that we also address below.
The remaining results of the second main row of Table 3 indicate a wage bill effect amongst
service providers similar to that of the number of service providers (1.1%). More importantly,
the total wage bill effect (-2%) is shown to be very similar to the employee wage bill effect,
as expected from the fact that, as indicated in Table 2, the spending on service providers
by industry is typically far smaller than that on formal employees (two vs 0.2 million euros,
on average). Finally, consistently with the effects on the number of workers and on their
wage bill, the average wage is not affected significantly. This result indicates a spillover effect
in that the wage increases for continuing workers previously paid below the then applicable
minimum wage tend to be cancelled by lower wage growth of their colleagues already paid
13See Martins (2008) for a related contribution based on a different Portuguese data set.
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above the new minimum wage.
Overall, these results clarify the theoretical discussion in terms of the important finding
that the extensions of collective agreements have a detrimental effect on employment. In ag-
gregate, industry-level terms, any gains from a level-playing field set by employer associations
and unions do not compensate the employment losses from wage floors potentially above the
marginal products of a number of workers employed by firms bound by the extensions. We
also find that the negative employment effect is driven by a reduction in hirings and not by an
increase in separations. This is consistent with evidence that adjustments are made primarily
by reducing entry and not by increasing separations (Abowd et al. 1999), in a context of
simultaneous hirings and separations in firms. This can be particularly important in settings
characterised by high separation costs of permanent workers as those resulting from strict em-
ployment protection legislations, as in Portugal (Blanchard & Portugal 2001, Martins 2009a,
OECD 2012).
On the other hand, the fact that the number of non-regulated service providers increases
suggests that there are important substitution effects between the two forms of labour con-
sidered here (formal employment and informal work). These can be seen as a response to the
increase in the minimum wage levels prompted by the extensions. This result is also relevant
from the perspective of the literature on segmented labour markets and the effects of partial
labour market reforms (Blanchard & Landier 2002), even if this literature has focused on the
split between permanent- and fixed-term contracts, disregarding the further segmentation in
terms of informal work that we examine here.
In any case, the employment effect (even including service providers) is shown to be similar
to the wage bill effect and, in particular, both are of a negative sign. This result is important
also in terms of the debate on the potential of internal demand stimuli during downturns
via administrative wage increases. Our case study of Portugal indicated that extensions not
only undermine employment - they also contribute to even lower levels of aggregate demand.
In other words, the aggregate internal demand gains in terms of higher salaries for those
that keep their jobs do not compensate the losses in salaries from those whose positions are
discontinued or that are not even hired in the first place.
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5 Robustness
5.1 Timing of the effects
In this section, we present a number of robustness checks regarding the main results of Table
3. First, we assess in greater detail the timing of the effects upon the main variables drawing
on our high-frequency, monthly data. In particular, we estimate equations of the following
structure:
Employmentit =
5∑
k=−3
βkExtitk + αi + γjt + eit. (2)
This equation follows closely the format of equation 1 and all variables have the same
interpretation as in there. Extitk are now a set of nine dummy variables, each equal to one in
a specific month before or after the extension is issued, from the third month before to the fifth
month after, including the same month when the extension is issued. This specification allows
for the estimation of a time profile of specific month effects, including before the extension,
as in anticipation effects.
Table 4 presents the results for each one of the five key variables from Table 3. The first
column, concerning the number of formal employees, presents a monotonic path of effects,
starting at -1.4% in the same month that the extension is issued (significant only at the 10%
level) and increasing gradually to -2.3% (significant at the 5% level) at the fourth month after
the extension. The second column examines the effect of extensions on hirings and finds that
they have their highest value on the month of the extension, at -9.4% (significant at the 1%
level) and average -6% (significant at least at the 5% level) along the following four months,
except in one case. There is some evidence of anticipation effects, in terms of coefficients
significant at the 10% level in the two months before the extension. As to separations, the
results indicate that there is not any significant effect across the nine months considered,
consistently with the results of Table 3.
In terms of wage bills, the effects are significant in the case of formal employees on the first,
third and fifth months after the extension, at about -2.5%. In the case of service providers,
the effects are significant over the months before the extension, the month of the extension
itself and two months after (the first and the fourth), at about 2% to 3%. This case - service
providers - is the only across the five variables in which there is evidence of effects before
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the extension is issued, while in the case of the number of workers and hirings there is also
evidence of effects in the actual month of the extension.
Overall, this month-by-month analysis supports our choice of a four-month time window
for the identification of the main effects. In particular, we find clear spikes in the effects (both
in terms of point estimates and statistical significance) across different outcome variables
once the extension is in force. These then tend to die out at the end of our preferred time
window. In the case of separations, for which we find no evidence of effects in our main
results, the detailed month-by-month analysis also indicates no impact of extensions in any
of the nine-month period considered.
5.2 Firm types
In our second set of robustness checks, we start by focusing on the effects of extensions
upon smaller firms. From our theoretical discussion, any negative effects of extensions on
employment are likely to be stronger amongst them. Smaller firms will tend to exhibit lower
marginal products of labour, which will make them more sensitive to increases in wage floors,
especially when facing liquidity constraints (Cabral & Mata 2003). We conduct our analysis of
this question by constructing a new time series of employment and other variables by industry
using only information from firms whose average size over the 2007-2011 period is not greater
than nine employees.
The results, presented on the first row of Table 5, indicate that the negative effect on
employment documented above is not only robust as it increases, by approximately 50%,
when focusing on smaller firms: -2.6% for this subset of the firm size distribution, compared
to -2% for the full population. Hirings are also negatively affected - by -2.2% - while, as
before, separations do not change systematically in the months just after extensions. Also
consistently with the main results, the wage bill of formal workers falls (-2.2%), by slightly
less than the effect on the number of workers. The only exception in terms of the similitude
of the two sets of results is that, unlike before, there is no positive effect on the wage bill of
service providers amongst small firms.
Table 5 also presents estimates obtained separately for the manufacturing and services
sectors. The results again prove robust, in particular the key finding of negative effects on
employment, at -1.9% and -1.4% respectively. Separations are not affected, as before, while
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hirings fall, albeit only significantly in the case of manufacturing. The wage bills also respond
in the same direction as in the main results, although only significantly in the case of services
(service providers).
5.3 Common support
An important additional area for robustness purposes is the similarity between different sec-
tors. Given our identification approach based on a difference-in-differences estimator, it is
important to draw on contrasting sectors that can be argued to provide credible counterfac-
tuals. Table 6 presents a number of additional analyses under this approach, complementing
those by economic sector conducted in the previous subsection.
The first analysis here considers only sectors where extensions are effectively carried out.
This choice follows from the fact that, as indicated above, a large number of sectors do
not exhibit any extensions over the period concerned, largely because they did not establish
collective agreements over those years. We consider only the three-digit industries that report
at least one extension over the period under analysis and all observations of their five-digit
industries. In this way, we can focus on an arguably more comparable control group of
industries that do not exhibit extensions, in the spirit of a (difference-in-differences) matching
approach, although at a potential cost in terms of the representativeness of the sample.
Reassuringly, the results under this analysis are particularly similar to those of Table
3, even if the number of observations falls by approximately half. According to the results
presented in the first row of Table 6, the effect of extensions on the number of workers and on
their wage bill is of -1.3% and -1.5% (significant at the 1% level), the effect on hirings is -3.5%
(significant at the 1% level), the effect on separations is -2.3% (significant at the 5% level)
while the effect on service providers’ wage bill (0.9%) is significant only at the 10% level.
The second row of Table 6 takes a different perspective on the common support criterion
by considering only those sectors that consistently report hirings and separations in every
month over the 2007-2001 period. This criterion implies that, unlike in previous estimations,
the number of observations is always the same for the four main variables (34,260). However,
the comparability of treated and control groups is less appropriate than in the approach of the
first row given that, for instance, those sectors can belong to very different industries. In any
case, once again the same qualitative results are found, namely of decreases in the number of
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workers and hirings and no effects on separations, despite declines in terms of significance and
even magnitude of the coefficients. The negative effect on the main wage bill is not significant,
unlike the positive effect of the service providers wage bill.
5.4 Time differences
The third row of Table 6 is concerned with the sensitivity of the results to different approaches
in controlling for time effects. Instead of the already very flexible set of controls adopted in
all results, based on a dummy variable for each month of each year in each one-digit industry,
we consider here a specification based on quadratic time trends by two-digit industries. The
results are again consistent with the previous evidence, in particular in the negative effects
on workers and hirings and the positive effect on the service providers’ wage bill. However,
we find in this case also evidence of a (marginally significant) positive effect on the wage bill
of workers.
The last analysis underlines the potential importance of specific time periods in explaining
the effects documented. In fact, as in Portugal the years 2008, 2009 and 2011 were of recession
while 2007 and 2010 were of moderate growth, these differences in the business cycle may
interact in some way with the extensions. Moreover, while extensions were issued across each
year, their production of effects tended to be concentrated in January in order to coincide
with the production of effects of the underlying collective agreement. This may also generate
interactions between the extensions that confound the effect of the latter.
In order to assess in greater detail the possible effects of different extensions over time,
we split the observations of the data set into different smaller periods. In particular, we split
the five-year period considered in two ways. First, from January 2007 until June 2009 and
from July 2009 until December 2011 (first and second rows). Second, January to June and
July to December of all years (2007 to 2011, third and fourth main rows). Table 7 presents
the results, which are again very similar to the benchmark findings of Table 3. The main
effect, on the number of workers, is always significantly negative, ranging between -1.3% and
-2.9%. Similarly, the effect of extensions on hirings is always significantly negative, in this case
ranging from -3.7% to -4%., as in the cases of the effects on the workers’ wage bill. Finally,
the effects on separations and the service providers’ wage bill are always insignificant, with
the exception of the months of July to December, when they are negative (-3.8%) and positive
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(3.6%), respectively.
5.5 Falsification exercise
The agreement signed between Portugal and the European Union and the International Mon-
etary Fund in May 2011 (IMF 2011) led to a suspension of the extension of collective agree-
ments by the new government that took office in June. This suspension was in force until
early 2012, when new criteria for extensions were under preparation. However, a number
of collective agreements had their administrative process of extension started by June 2011,
namely through the publication of notices by the Ministry of Labour indicating the intention
of extending such agreements following the request by the collective agreement subscribers.
Although those extensions did not come into force at least until mid-2012, they can be used
to provide further evidence on the causal interpretation of our results. If, as we argue, following
the evidence presented above, the increase in minimum wages determined by extensions hurts
employment in the sectors affected, then extensions that are announced but do not actually
come into full force should not have such negative, wider employment effects. For instance, an
alternative interpretation may be that the negative effects documented here are driven not so
much by the extension itself but instead by the coming into force of the collective agreement
subject to the extension.14
We conduct this additional check on the validity of our results under a falsification ap-
proach. More specifically, we identified a set of 15 such potential extensions which had been
subject to a preliminary public notice and that also meet the condition of being linkable to
collective agreements that were subject to extensions in previous years. These agreements
cover a wide set of industries, such as Security services, Chemical and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, Textiles, Food distribution, Furniture, Merchandising, Meat distribution, Bread, and
Fish processing. As explained above, collective agreements tend to be revised regularly, on
a yearly or lower frequency. Such revisions tend to be focused on the wage floors set for
each job type and job category although they occasionally also include other provisions. This
time linkage allows us to use the information collected by the Ministry of Labour regarding
the agreements - and their potential extensions - namely along the range of industries poten-
14This concern is not supported from the results regarding the timing of the effects (Table 4), which tend
to coincide with the actual timing of the extension, although in a few cases they start one or two months
before. However, even such few indications of ‘antecipation’ are reconcilable with the fact that extensions are
announced before they are issued and come into effect. Furthermore, collective agreements are disclosed before
that and, over the period examined, were virtually always subject to an extension.
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tially affected. This linkage is conducted under the assumption that the industry ranges are
unchanged from previous, equivalent collective agreements.
After that, we created a data set with exactly the same characteristics as the one used for
our main analysis, except that the only extensions considered are those from the specific set
of 15 discussed here, and used it for the same type of analysis presented above, namely those
based on equation 1. Given that these specific extensions were not issued and the dates when
extensions are issued are used for the key right-hand-side four-month dummy variable, we
imputed the likely date of issuance based on previous extensions of previous versions of the
same reference collective agreements and historical information on the typical time gap until
the publication of the extension (two months). In our final data set, only the 15 extensions
have the ‘Four months post extension’ dummies switched on. These are also the only ones
whose potential impacts on the dependent variables are considered in the table. Moreover,
given that these potential extensions would be issued only between May and September of
2011, we restricted the sample used here to the second half of our period, i.e. to 2009:07-
2011:12 (as in the second main row of Table 7), in order to draw on a more comparable
distribution of observations between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ periods.
Table 8 presents the results. Unlike in our main findings (Table 3) on the results specific to
the subperiod considered, we now find that all main coefficients are insignificant, in particular
in the case of the number of workers (1.2%, with a standard error of 1.1%). The only exception
is the wage bill of service providers but that has the ‘wrong’ sign (-2.7%) and is significant only
at the 10% level. Other restrictions on the data set, similar to previous robustness checks,
generate similar results, in particular involving no effects on employment or hirings (results
available upon request).
We interpret the results from this falsification exercise as additional evidence of a causal
relationship between extensions and the different economic variables studied here, as well
as providing a more precise perspective of the actual mechanism underpinning the results.
Specifically, we find that only those extensions that become legally binding have negative
effects on employment and other economics variables. This result also indicates that collective
agreements by themselves do not necessarily have negative effects, provided their scope is not
extended beyond bargaining parties.
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6 Firm entry and exit effects
Given the important effects documented above regarding employment flows, it is of interest
to investigate their underpinnings also in terms of the firm entry and exit margins. If the
working conditions and, in particular, minimum wages set by extensions are not affordable by
some firms, then an effect in terms of firm exit could be anticipated. Similarly, entrepreneurs
may be discouraged from launching new businesses when they face less flexibility in the wage
conditions that may offer their new workers. This approach is even more relevant given the
evidence presented before of stronger negative employment effects amongst smaller firms.
We examine these questions by constructing a new data set derived from the original
monthly information on all firms. Specifically, first we identify new firms as those whose
individual identifiers appear for the first time in the data in a given month, while old firms
are those whose individual identifers appear for the last time in the data in a given month. We
then create a count of their number per month, as well as of the number of formal employees
and service providers per month. The latter two variables indicate the flows of workers and
service providers that join (leave) the industry at the time the firm enters (exits) the market, as
in the context of the literature on job and worker flows (Abowd et al. 1999). We then employ
the same estimation approach as that of equation 1, considering the log of the number of firms,
formal employees and service providers as the alternative dependent variables, separately for
firm entry and firm exit.
Table 9 present the results. The first row considers firm entry effects, where all coefficients
are statistically insignificant. This indicates that the emergence of new firms is not affected
by the extension of collective agreements. The same applies to the time series of formal
employees and service providers hired by such new firms, which are not significantly different
at the months immediately following the extensions. However, when turning to the second
row of Table 9, which considers firm exit effects, we find the number of firms that leaves an
industry increases significantly - by 4% - over the four months subsequent to an extension. The
effect on service providers is similar (4.3%), while the coefficient on the workers specification
is also equivalent in magnitude (5%) but, unlike before, not significant.
We take these results - in particular, the increased firm exit - to add further support to
the view that extensions create difficulties for some firms, particularly given the noisiness
inherent in firm-level monthly data on entry and exit. Such noisiness can explain the absence
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of significant effects on firm entry, although noncompliance may also be more significant
amongst new firms, to the extent that they are not fully aware of all regulations that they are
subject to.
The fact that the exit effect is significant as far as the number of service providers is
concerned but not in terms of formal workers can be potentially explained by a greater reliance
upon the former by firms most affected by the extensions. Such firms may have a preference
towards informal workers which makes the hardening of the worker conditions imposed on
their formal labour force component - which tends to represent a greater share of the total
wage bill, at least on average, as discussed before - more difficult to withstand, prompting
their closure. Additionally, the difference in the statistical significance between the firm
number and workers effects may be explained by a smaller average firm size of firms that
exit following an extension. As indicated before, smaller firms have lower average employer
association membership rates and are thus less likely to see their interests regarding working
conditions considered during their bargaining with unions. Moreover, our results from Section
5.2 indicate that small firms are more negatively affected by extensions.
7 Conclusions
Several countries extend collective bargaining agreements to entire sectors, therefore binding
non-subscriber workers and employers and widening substantially the number of minimum
wages that may be binding across a given country. These extension procedures may address
coordination issues in a sector, freezing competition along some human resource management
dimensions, promoting greater equity in pay, fostering investments in human capital and
prompting managers to focus their work on other areas of their businesses. On the other
hand, extensions may impose sector- and or occupation-specific minimum wages and other
work conditions that are not appropriate for many firms and workers, especially if the collective
agreement subscribing unions or employer associations are not representative. Moreover,
extensions increase the scope for downward nominal wage rigidity, with potential negative
effects on employment, particularly during downturns in low-inflation environments as in the
eurozone recently.
In this paper, we analyse empirically the impact of extensions along several relevant eco-
nomic margins drawing on firm-level monthly data for Portugal, a country where such exten-
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sions have been widespread until recently, leading to nearly 30,000 de facto minimum wages
(one for each main job in each industry). Our results, based on a difference-in-differences
approach, indicate that extensions have a significantly causal negative effect on employment.
In the four months after an extension is issued, formal employment falls on average by 2%.
Also, this effect is 25% larger across small firms, those less likely to be represented in col-
lective agreements negotiations. Firm closures are also found to increase significantly in the
months after an extension is issued in the respective sector. Given the increasing rate of un-
employment (and particularly youth unemployment) over the period, coupled with evidence
of substantial nominal wage rigidity (Dias et al. 2013), such employment losses are not likely
to have been absorbed by other sectors.
Furthermore, the effect of extensions on sectoral wage bills is also negative, as the em-
ployment impact outweighs the wage increase resulting from extensions. On the other hand,
informal work, which is not subject to collective agreements or to labour law, tends to increase,
contributing towards greater labour market segmentation.
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Tables
Table 1: Number of collective agreements and extensions, 2005-2012
Type Sectoral Multi-firm Firm-specific Extensions
agreements agreements agreements
Year Number of agreements
2005 151 28 73 56
2006 153 26 65 192
2007 160 27 64 104
2008 172 27 97 178
2009 142 22 87 128
2010 141 25 64 140
2011 93 22 55 24
2012 36 9 40 13
Number of workers
2005 1,015,976 68,748 36,748
2006 1,343,643 73,390 37,267
2007 1,430,660 58,233 32,384
2008 1,778,216 47,232 69,398
2009 1,299,371 59,902 37,952
2010 1,309,267 64,455 33,344
2011 1,160,080 52,737 24,102
2012 291,068 26,645 9,909
Notes: Sectoral agreements (‘Contratos coletivos de trabalho’) are established between one or more employer
associations and one or more unions. Multi-firm agreements (‘Acordos coletivos de trabalho’) are established
between a group of firms and one or more unions. Firm-specific agreements (‘Acordos de empresa’) are
established between one firm and one or more unions. Extensions are issued by the government and widen a
collective agreement (typically a sectoral agreement) to the entire sector beyond the workers subject to double
affiliation. The number of workers indicated correspond to those bound by a collective agreement after the
latter is extended. The number of extensions can exceed that of agreements because extensions can be issued
with respect to agreements signed in the previous year.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics - main data set
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Formal employees 83896 2095.9 6903.3 0 172165
Service providers 83896 214.1 912.7 0 27134
Wage bill (employees) 83896 2065801 6323416 0 1.93x108
Wage bill (service providers) 83896 221225.4 841931.4 0 3.07x107
Job creation 76794 14.1 98.4 0 5585
Job destruction 83936 10.9 89.6 0 6898
Hirings 83896 60.1 356.3 0 25609
Separations 83896 62.2 361.6 0 16273
Firm entry 82556 2.3 8.7 0 355
Workers (New firms) 82556 3.7 31.6 0 4936
Firm exit 83936 2.5 10.5 0 693
Workers (Exiting firms) 83936 5.1 39.0 0 4877
Month 83896 6.5 3.4 1 12
Year 83896 2009.0 1.4 2007 2011
Four months post extension 83936 .0318 .1757 0 1
Notes: ‘Formal employees’ denotes the number of formal workers employed across five-digit sectors over the
2007-2011 monthly period. ’Service providers’ corresponds to the number of individuals that provide services
to firms across the different sector-month observations (outside the scope of a formal labour contract). The
two ‘Wage bill’ variables denote the total pay of workers or service providers in nominal euros. ’Hirings’ and
‘Separations’ are the number of new social security identifiers reported by firms in each month compared to
the previous month or that are not reported in the following month, respectively. ‘Month’ and ‘Year’ indicate
the relevant cell date. ‘Four months post extension’ is a dummy variable equal to one over the four months
immediately after an extension is issued in the respective five-digit sector.
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Table 3: Main results - Employment and Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employees Hirings Separations ServiceProviders
Four months -.020 -.041 -.014 .014
post ext. (.004)
∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.012) (.003)∗∗∗
Obs. 83358 60179 62457 67911
R2 .988 .887 .907 .983
Wagebill WagebillSP TotalWagebill AvgWage
Four months -.022 .011 -.020 -.002
post ext. (.005)
∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.003)
Obs. 83358 67911 83896 83358
R2 .984 .975 .984 .875
Notes: Each coefficient reported is obtained from a separate regression based on the dependent variable in-
dicated at the heading of each one of the eight groups of statistics. ‘Employees’ indicates the total number
of employees per sector-month. ‘ServiceProviders’ corresponds to the number of individual service providers
working for each firm in each sector. ‘WageBill’ (‘WageBillSP’) corresponds to the total nominal pay of employ-
ees (service providers) in each sector. ‘TotalWagebill’ corresponds to the sum of ‘WageBill’ and ‘WageBillSP’.
‘AvgWage’ corresponds to the average wage per employee (i.e. the ratio between ‘WageBillEe’ and ‘Workers’).
All dependent variables are measured in logs. All specifications include (over 1,400) five-digit-sector fixed
effects and (540) month/year/one-digit-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors. Significance levels: *:
0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 4: Time profile effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employees Hirings Separations Wagebill WagebillSP
m(-3) -.006 -.004 -.019 -.017 .031
(.008) (.022) (.020) (.013) (.009)∗∗∗
m(-2) -.007 -.038 -.028 -.010 .033
(.008) (.023)∗ (.021) (.010) (.010)∗∗∗
m(-1) -.009 -.041 .021 .003 .029
(.007) (.024)∗ (.021) (.010) (.009)∗∗∗
m(0) -.014 -.095 .013 -.014 .030
(.007)∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.023) (.009) (.009)∗∗∗
m(1) -.017 -.069 -.009 -.027 .020
(.007)∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.021) (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗
m(2) -.018 -.026 -.018 -.012 .010
(.007)∗∗∗ (.024) (.021) (.009) (.008)
m(3) -.020 -.043 -.002 -.027 -.001
(.007)∗∗∗ (.024)∗ (.021) (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)
m(4) -.023 -.046 -.030 -.017 .021
(.007)∗∗∗ (.024)∗ (.021) (.009)∗ (.008)∗∗
m(5) -.014 .020 -.012 -.024 .004
(.007)∗∗ (.025) (.022) (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)
Obs. 83358 60179 62457 83358 67911
R2 .988 .887 .907 .984 .975
Notes: The coefficients reported in each column are obtained from separate regressions based on the dependent
variable indicated at the heading of the column. ‘m(t)’ refers to ‘t’ months after the extension is issued
(e.g. m(0) refers to the month when the extension is issued and m(-1) to the month before the extension
is issued). Dependent variables are measured in logs. All specifications include (over 1,400) five-digit-sector
fixed effects and (540) month-year-one-digit-industry fixed effects. See notes to Table 3 for more information.
Robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 5: Robustness checks I - Firm size and sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employees Hirings Separations Wagebill WagebillSP
Small firms only
Four months -.026 -.022 -.011 -.024 .005
post ext. (.004)
∗∗∗ (.013)∗ (.012) (.005)∗∗∗ (.006)
Obs. 81434 50728 53078 81434 65305
R2 .985 .879 .89 .978 .972
Manufacturing only
Four months -.019 -.057 -.007 -.020 .016
post ext. (.006)
∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.018) (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗
Obs. 31007 19516 21103 31007 23097
R2 .989 .819 .861 .986 .975
Services only
Four months -.014 .008 .007 -.016 .005
post ext. (.005)
∗∗∗ (.018) (.016) (.007)∗∗ (.008)
Obs. 42172 33636 34179 42172 36737
R2 .986 .904 .919 .982 .976
Notes: ‘Small firms’ refers to results based on a sector-level data set constructed only from firms that employ
a mean of employees below 10 over the period available. ‘Manufacturing (services) only’ refers to results based
on a sector-level data set constructed only from ISIC rev 4 sectors 10 to 33 (45 to 98) firms. Dependent
variables are measured in logs. All specifications include (over 1,400) five-digit-sector fixed effects and (540)
month-year-one-digit-industry fixed effects. See notes to Table 3 for more information. Robust standard errors.
Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 6: Robustness checks II - Common support and time controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employees Hirings Separations Wagebill WagebillSP
Sectors with extensions
Four months -.015 -.035 -.023 -.017 .009
post ext. (.004)
∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗
Obs. 43909 34250 35378 43909 37775
R2 .992 .897 .915 .989 .984
Sectors with constant flows
Four months -.004 -.014 .00003 -.003 .014
post ext. (.002)
∗ (.014) (.011) (.003) (.004)∗∗∗
Obs. 34260 34260 34260 34260 33910
R2 .992 .876 .905 .989 .978
Alternative time controls
Four months -.014 -.008 .001 -.019 .008
post ext. (.004)
∗∗∗ (.014) (.012) (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗
Obs. 83358 60179 62457 83358 67911
R2 .988 .878 .9 .983 .974
Notes: ‘Sectors with constant flows’ are the five-digit industries that always report both positive hirings
and positive separations over the observations available. ‘Sectors with extensions’ are the five-digit industries
under three-digit industries that report at least one extension over the period under analysis. ‘Alternative time
controls’ controls for quadratic time trends by two-digit industries (instead of one-digit-industry month/year
dummies). Dependent variables are measured in logs. All specifications include (over 1,400) five-digit-sector
fixed effects. The first two specifications also include (540) month-year-one-digit-industry fixed effects. See
notes to Table 3 for more information. Robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 7: Robustness checks III - Different time periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employees Hirings Separations Wagebill WagebillSP
2007:01-2009:06 only
Four months -.029 -.040 -.004 -.024 -.003
post ext. (.006)
∗∗∗ (.021)∗ (.018) (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)
Obs. 41470 30956 31482 41470 33744
R2 .99 .901 .916 .986 .975
2009:07-2011:12 only
Four months -.013 -.035 -.022 -.021 -.007
post ext. (.004)
∗∗∗ (.018)∗ (.015) (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)
Obs. 41888 29223 30975 41888 34167
R2 .995 .894 .915 .993 .989
January-June, all years
Four months -.014 -.040 .007 -.015 -.000
post ext. (.005)
∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗ (.016) (.007)∗∗ (.007)
Obs. 48654 34585 36647 48654 39610
R2 .988 .886 .909 .984 .977
July-December, all years
Four months -.024 -.037 -.038 -.021 .036
post ext. (.007)
∗∗∗ (.021)∗ (.017)∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Obs. 34704 25594 25810 34704 28301
R2 .987 .9 .916 .985 .975
Notes: ‘2007:01-2009:06’ (‘2009:07-2011:12’) corresponds to observations from January 2007 until June 2009
(July 2009 until December 2011). ‘January-June’ (‘July-December’) corresponds to observations from January
to June (July to December) in each year. Dependent variables are measured in logs. All specifications include
(over 1,400) five-digit-sector fixed effects and (540) month-year-one-digit-industry fixed effects. See notes to
Table 3 for more information. Robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
34
Table 8: Falsification exercise - Extensions planned but not issued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employees Hirings Separations Wagebill WagebillSP
Four months .012 -.055 -.010 .004 -.027
post ext. (.011) (.049) (.040) (.015) (.015)
∗
Obs. 41888 29223 30975 41888 34167
R2 .995 .894 .915 .993 .989
Notes: These results are based on a subset of 15 potential extensions that were considered publicly by the
Labour Ministry in 2011 but were not issued. The results presented are based on an imputation of the likely
date of issuance and information on the industry impact of the extensions based on previous extensions of
previous versions of the same reference collective agreements and historical information on the time gap until
the publication of the extension. Only the 15 extensions switch on the ‘Four months post extension’ dummies
whose potential impact on the dependent variables is considered in the table.The analysis covers the period
2009:07-2011:12. Dependent variables are measured in logs. All specifications include (over 1,400) five-digit-
sector fixed effects and month-year-one-digit-industry fixed effects. See notes to Table 3 for more information.
Robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 9: Firm entry and exit effects
(1) (2) (3)
Log Firms Log Workers Log ServiceProviders
Firm entry
Four months -.008 -.003 -.012
post ext. (.018) (.032) (.022)
Obs. 29969 25471 19006
R2 .763 .58 .72
Firm exit
Four months .040 .050 .043
post ext. (.015)
∗∗∗ (.033) (.021)∗∗
Obs. 33581 29479 19372
R2 .806 .59 .728
Notes: Firm entry and exit is identified from the first and last occurrence of firm identifiers in the data. ‘Firms’
refers to the number of new or dying firms in each five-industry and month. ‘Workers’ (‘Service providers’)
refers to the number of workers (service providers) in such two types of firms over the first or last month of
the firm. Dependent variables are measured in logs. All specifications include (over 1,400) five-digit-sector
fixed effects and (540) month-year-one-digit-industry fixed effects. See notes to Table 3 for more information.
Robust standard errors. Significance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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